Ethiopia Center for Strategic Studies (here after referred to as ECS) is first and foremost an idea, aspiration, or a vision optimistically projecting politically strong, economically stable, and socio-culturally meaningful Ethiopia. On the other hand, ECS is a research-focused institution that identifies, predicts, and recommends alternative course of actions pertaining to pressing problems hindering Ethiopia’s march for a viable political economy and democratic culture. Briefly noted, these challenges do not necessarily go beyond three major interrelated issues squarely confronting Ethiopia, having both internal and external dimensions.        

Apparently, one of these issues concerns problems associated with Ethiopia’s political economy. Since the 1960s, Ethiopia’s public sphere has been principally entangled with the questions of identity politics and political restructuring. However, almost all political actors, government and oppositions, were literally unable to bring about philosophically robust and socio-politically feasible ideas and meaningful course of actions. In the post-socialist Ethiopia, the idea and practice of ethnic based federalism in Ethiopia remains contested, politically, philosophically, and practically, since the TPLF-led EPRDF came to power and implemented it.                  

The proactively propounded but hesitatingly applied ethnic federalism resulted in contradictory outcomes. Despite its successes and symbolic gestures, the system of federalism and the actual implementation in the greater part of the last three decades have been proven, as validated through multiple researches, counterproductive in many ways. One of these was the ambiguous power distance between regional and federal powers in Ethiopia. Unfortunately, the TPLF-led EPRDF regime had controlled major centers of power, defying one of the central axioms of federalism, the decentralization of power. This has led many to believe that the system of federalism and the way it was implemented rather facilitated the strengthening of rule by the minority, the “disintegration” of the country, unjust resource (political and economic) distributions, and interethnic conflicts and violence. 

Furthermore, Ethiopia in transition under ODP-led EPRDF is facing the problematic legacy of TPLF-led EPRDF. Of these problems, again, those associated with ethnic federalism stand out. Following the “unconditional” political liberalization in these two years (2018-2019) in the country, different ethnic groups’ “demand” for regional-statehood, which were ignored, suppressed or denied under the TPLF-led EPRDF regime, are now squarely confronting the Ethiopian state under the transition. Obviously, despite being constitutionally guaranteed, the idea, and practice of ethnic based federalism in Ethiopia, has been wrapped up with piles of multiple philosophical and practical challenges.

On the philosophical front, there are still debates as to whether the existing constitution stands up to the expectations of Ethiopia’s heterogeneous cultural groups, communities, and citizens. On this issue, there are at least two political actors standing on the opposite end of the political spectrum, those demanding a slight or no constitutional amendment or modification and those who demand major change in the content(s) of the constitution.

In practical terms, partly arising from the constitution and partly from the absence of political willingness, the current transitional government at best appears confused as to how to address the demand for regional statehood spearheaded by the political elites of the Sidama, Wolayata, Gurage, and other peoples from the different corners of Ethiopia. Despite the constitutionality of the quest for regional statehood, the procedural and political mechanisms appear less responsive. This had sent wrong messages and this, in turn, led to devastating consequences. What happened in Hawasa against different ethnic groups in the early 2019 is a relevant instance.

Although the transitional government finally decided to undertake the referendum that ultimately determined Sidama’s quest for regional statehood, the problem of maintaining Ethiopia’s national integrity and properly-constitutionally and politically-address the questions of regional statehood in Ethiopia is far from over. In fact, it has just begun. Ultimately, however, the way the government manages Sidama’s case will shade some light on how it plans to strike the balance between Ethiopia as a nation and manages regional statehood questions in later periods.               

Another issue of equal importance concerns the issues of religious plurality and state-religion relation in Ethiopia. From general observations, these things continue attracting lesser attention from politicians, state or non-state actors, researchers, and the media. Even though religious plurality and state-religion interaction had been mostly problematic and one-sided for centuries, the post-Dergue Ethiopian state has not necessarily been able to deal with it effectively.        

The TPLF-led EPRDF regime has been patently conflicted about the question of religious plurality, interreligious relations, and religion-state relation in Ethiopia since it came to power. However, following the 2005 national election in Ethiopia, the state-society relation had essentially moved from bad to worse. As the national election signaled popular dissatisfaction against the TPLF rule in the country, human and democratic rights, the political field, and the overall public sphere started shrinking and worsening. The same was TPLF-led EPRDF’s approach to religion in Ethiopia. For the first time in the post-monarchical Ethiopia, the government took an approach to religion, a variant of secularism, that, both overtly and covertly, undermine the role and function of religious institutions in the country. This applies to both Christianity and Islam in Ethiopia.  

The TPLF-led government worked hard to divide the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC). By promoting and selectively sponsoring a particular group form the Church, it helped divide the EOTC into two, one based in Ethiopia and another one in North America. This has been causing significant problems to the social functions of EOTC until the transitional government came and resolved it.

Similarly, the TPLF-led EPRDF regime selectively supported and attempted to impose Al-Abash, a religious sect that had already garnered fewer followers in the Eastern part of Ethiopia but had significant cultural and political association and root in the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon, as a state sponsored religion in the country. This had caused almost decade-long mass protest and political turmoil in the country. Although the TPLF regime attempted to control the popular dissatisfaction through force and threat, it did not succeed. In fact, the very problematic engagement of the TPLF-led EPRDF regime with religion and ethnic groups in the country facilitated its eventual demise from the center of Ethiopian politics.

In short, apart from ethnic and religious issues in the country, other equally important aspects of individual and collective existence worsened in the last three decades, despite the commonly recycled economic growth registered in Ethiopia. Poverty, income inequality, food insecurity, drought, begging, interethnic conflicts, and others remain serious causes of concerns that continue to test Ethiopia as a state. Therefore, ECS will attempt to study these political, sociocultural, and economic issues affecting Ethiopia through identifying them, predicting possible scenarios, and recommending alternative course of actions.