The Tigray Conflict: Relevant Dimensions and Unwarranted Interventions t Here
Mukerrem Miftah*
What has just happened in Ethiopia? What went wrong with the USA and Europe? Can we reasonably argue and justify that the US, many European countries, Western media outlets, Western-based academics-turned activists have been engaging with the Tigray war in relative objectivity and balanced manner? Can we talk about the relative efficacy of “this” intervention in terms of specifically identifying problems and actors in the Tigray conflict and addressing it or causing irreparable damages to the Ethiopian society? This reflective commentary furthers the point that none of these succeeded; rather, the consequences of “this” intervention have been much more heavily borne by ordinary Ethiopian citizens than by any other. It argues that both the means and ends of “this” intervention have been largely unwarranted on many grounds. In terms of organization, the first part briefly explores the three relevant dimensions of the Tigray conflict, and the second part attempts at explaining the extent to which the Western-led intervention in Tigray has been largely biased, unprincipled, and more generally, unwarranted.
The Tigray Conflict: Local, Regional, and Global Dimensions
Manifestly speaking, the ongoing war between the TPLF and Ethiopia’s federal government has at least three inseparable dimensions. On the one hand, there is the incompatibility of goals that led to the conflict. Regardless of the plausibility of pursued causes, the lives of many innocent civilians were destroyed and the impact remains deeply felt throughout the country. Yet, factors that led to this war cannot be reduced to the problematic nature of communications between Ethiopia’s federal government and the TPLF. Certainly, no serious observer of Ethiopia and the Horn can authoritatively claim what is happening in Ethiopia as the foreseeable outcome of the colliding proclivity of the two warring entities. As Clapham rightly observed, the Horn, the greater part of which is Ethiopia, is “an extremely complex region, in which layers upon layers of potential problems are piled one on top of another”. In other words, reductionist tendencies can only serve some other purposes, mostly invidious political ends, rather than academic or social scientific pursuits.
One has to come to terms with what Clapham styled as “potential problems” before forthrightly prescribing painkillers, as some would have us believe, to “contemporary” problems. This perspective runs the risk of ignoring the spatio-temporal contours of many of our human experiences. Time and space largely define, condition, and/or mold our individual as well as social engagements. Of these, time helps us make sense of our “contemporary” experiences through the navigation of the past and the thrill, curiosity, and opportunism of the future. Put differently, it is an intelligibly pertinent pursuit to contextually make sense of what is currently unfolding in Ethiopia. In light of this, a plethora of factors might need to be properly comprehended. It would be beneficial to look into such factors as the (potential or real) role of historical understandings in the (re)making of Ethiopia’s nation and state-building; the absence of a political culture that includes elite consensus and coalition building-the scarcest commodity in Ethiopia’s political culture and history; political (and popular) over zealousness (and over expectations) conditioning the diagnosis of challenges and responses; the challenges of transitional politics and justice; egocentric and ethnocentric proclivities of political elites and others. Without a thorough and meticulous appraisal of these and related other factors and conditions, single-factor focused analysis and prescription can only be a political tranquilizer. Furthermore, all these can only constitute the local dimension to the Tigray conflict.
The regional dimension concerns the direct and indirect role of Africa’s political economy conditioning the conflict in Tigray. The role of Egypt and Sudan cannot be underestimated. The failed political transition in Sudan, partly because of Egypt’s permanent presence and influence in Khartoum; the difficulty of disentangling the role and influence of the military complex from Sudan’s body politic; and partly because of the fragmented and overzealous (and over expectations) of political elites and protesters in Sudan, may have made Sudan play some roles in the ongoing conflict in Ethiopia. This could be approached as an attempt by the military leadership of Sudan to redirect popular dissatisfaction from Sudan to Ethiopia, Sudan’s military might be advancing its northern neighbor’s causes in Ethiopia, a simple opportunist intervention to claim historically contested territories, a combination of these and others. Therefore, either through what Ethiopia’s federal government contends direct military intrusion into Ethiopia (as in Al Fashqa) or support anti-federal government forces like the TPLF, Sudan remains an important factor that, in some ways, conditions the current war in Ethiopia.
When it comes to Egypt, Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD) construction project stands out as the important factor for Egypt’s alleged involvement in the Tigray conflict. Certainly, we know that Egypt views the construction of the GERD as a major national security threat that it will do anything to halt. This may involve working with forces that challenge and put pressure on Ethiopia’s federal government. To this end, Egypt may have well been working with Sudan’s military and other opposition forces fighting Ethiopia’s federal government. We also know that Egypt’s El-Sisi continues to influence USA’s engagement with Ethiopia’s federal government. Apart from being Trump’s “favorite dictator”, El-Sisi’s totalitarian rule currently pays $65,000 monthly to the lobbying group “Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck” aiming, among other things, to put pressure on Biden’s administration in its dealing with Ethiopia[i].
The third and perhaps one of the most critical dimensions in Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict is the role of global and/ or international actors and institutions. This mainly concerns the role and sustained influence of the USA, member states of the European Union, the United Nations, and other foreign-based institutions and individuals. Many of the actions of these entities have largely been beyond a measure of civility. In other words, following the outbreak of the war between Ethiopia’s federal government and the TPLF forces, the decisions, reports, interventions, and sanctions adopted have been, as will be detailed shortly, by no means approximate a reasonably intelligible course of action. Rather, the message appears clear that none of these actors and institutions have been working to serve either the people or political elites of the Tigray regional state and Ethiopia. This is the exact meaning underpinning Machiavellian realism in the study of international relations. A brief look at the expressions of this follows next.
Certainly, no serious observer of Ethiopia and the Horn can authoritatively claim what is happening in Ethiopia as the foreseeable outcome of the colliding proclivity of the two warring entities. As Clapham rightly observed, the Horn, the greater part of which is Ethiopia, is “an extremely complex region, in which layers upon layers of potential problems are piled one on top of another”.
Interrogating the USA’s Sustained Pressure
Following the advent of Abiy Ahmed-led administration in Ethiopia’s power politics since 2018, the USA has been pragmatic and at times unpredictable. Underpinning USA’s pragmatism though, stood, loud and clear, its national interests in the Horn of Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular. Whether it be due to the USA’s close ties to the dictatorial El-Sisi’s regime and the issue of GERD; the USA’s inability to appoint or forge a puppet regime like the TPLF-led EPRDF regime in Ethiopia; the growing fear that the USA is being overtaken by China in global power politics and the manifest presence and influence of China in Ethiopia; or something else, the actions, decisions, and moves of the USA’s government has been more than erratic and negative.
Approached, therefore, from the perspective of the Abiy-led government, the Ethiopian state, and/ or the people of Ethiopia, the policy direction and decisions of the US government have been largely unwarranted. For many Ethiopian citizens, civil society organizations, academics, and some opposition groups, the signal from the US government has been increasingly becoming one-sided, and most importantly, solely serving the US interest in Ethiopia. It has become quite clear that the US government has been largely careless about the Ethiopian state and society, and that the interest and concern for democracy and human rights were largely symbolic and cannot be logically pursued when something stands against the interests and aspirations of the US.
Hosting and sponsoring disgruntled, opportunist, and political sociologically not commanding individuals and political parties can only mean one thing, the USA’s foreign policy for Ethiopia[i]. Countries’ policies cannot be appraised as the policy by and for political elites. Policies, foreign policies, in particular, are meant to engage political elites, political parties, the state itself, and the people. The US government’s move to forge an alliance between opposition groups against the Abiy-led administration; the various sanctions such as making Ethiopia lose its AGOA beneficiary status (effective 1 January 2022) which in turn makes Ethiopia lose about $100 million in “hard cash” annually and job opportunities for about 100,000 Ethiopian women[ii]; the USA’s sustained and mounting pressure on the UN (and the security council) to indiscriminately challenge the Ethiopian state and society; American diplomats discussing and deciding the fate of Ethiopia and its administration[iii]; and others were largely counterproductive and shortsighted.
Undoubtedly, these decisions and moves have not solely targeted the political elites and/ or the Prosperity Party that is currently ruling the country. These moves did not discriminate between party politics, the people, and the state. Many Ethiopian citizens, including those who have not necessarily subscribed to the visions and actions of the Abiy-led administration, joined in the “No More” movement that aimed at challenging what they considered some form of foreign intervention in Ethiopia[iv]. Many African leaders, intellectuals, activists, and journalists have expanded the contours of the “No More” movement[v]. Among others, France and England may have been understandably worried that the already internally simmering resentment of some African countries can reasonably challenge their Francophone and Anglophone political and economic arrangements. They might be fearful and reasonable to think that the “No More” movement is resuscitating anti-colonial sensibilities and promoting Pan-Africanism[vi]. Some Africans (and Non-Africans[vii]) have instrumentalized the opportunity to advance the decades-old question of African states garnering places in the UN’s Security Council[viii]. This certainly makes the West take any actions, erratic or not.
Hosting and sponsoring disgruntled, opportunist, and political sociologically not commanding individuals and political parties can only mean one thing, the USA’s foreign policy for Ethiopia[i]. Countries’ policies cannot be appraised as the policy by and for political elites. Policies, foreign policies, in particular, are meant to engage political elites, political parties, the state itself, and the people. The US government’s move to forge an alliance between opposition groups against the Abiy-led administration; the various sanctions such as making Ethiopia lose its AGOA beneficiary status (effective 1 January 2022) which in turn makes Ethiopia lose about $100 million in “hard cash” annually and job opportunities for about 100,000 Ethiopian women[ii]; the USA’s sustained and mounting pressure on the UN (and the security council) to indiscriminately challenge the Ethiopian state and society; American diplomats discussing and deciding the fate of Ethiopia and its administration[iii]; and others were largely counterproductive and shortsighted.
Human Rights Abuse Investigation to What End?
The recent (December 2021) call for a new investigation into allegations of human rights violations and abuses in Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict is beyond erratic. In a special session held at “the request of the European Union”[i], a plan to establish an international commission of human rights experts on Ethiopia was tabled and voted on. Interestingly, out of the Council’s 47 member states, it was only 21 of them who had supported the new plan. The remaining countries, 26, either rejected or abstained from it. What is interesting about this is not whether it was only nearly half-favored or not; rather, the distribution of countries. Almost all of the countries that favored establishing another investigating commission were Europeans and other European-puppet states. No single African country supported the move. Some six African countries, including Sudan and Senegal, abstained. However, the remaining African countries rightly “called for the resolution to be rejected, saying that the proposed investigation mechanism was “counterproductive and likely to exacerbate tensions”[ii]. This was, therefore, largely a unilateral European plan of action against Ethiopia, not against Ethiopia’s federal government or Tigray’s TPLF forces. Although the TPLF forces welcomed the plan, Ethiopia’s federal government rejected it in toto. Yet, beyond supporting and rejecting this European Union’s plan, it is pertinent to inquire into its ultimate aspirations.
Was it simply aimed at fact-finding in issues of human rights violations and abuses or securing “own” facts and evidence to blame alleged instigators or use it as leverage to set in motion an all-inclusive peacemaking process? Had it been aimed at peacemaking and fact-finding, the earlier joint investigation by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and the UN Human Rights Office could have paved the way for more meaningful steps. The report (November 2021), apart from unveiling some serious violations of human rights and abuses, accused all culpably involved of committing various crimes. It included the TPLF, Ethiopia’s defense forces, Eritrean forces, and the Amhara regional state-affiliated forces. Except for the TPLF, all, even Ethiopia’s federal government with some reservations, accepted the results. Yet, the UN, the USA, and European countries have squarely failed to do anything meaningful with the findings and recommendations of the investigation. It seems, therefore, that with the federal government of Ethiopia’s growing dissatisfaction with the actions and inactions of the West and the feeling that they are losing credibility in Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict, they had to come up with another source of leverage. From the looks of it, however, it is unlikely that this very recent investigation plan can go nowhere.
Media Bias and Academics-turned Activists
Western media outlets such as CNN, Reuters, France 24, the Associated Press, and the BBC have been in the business of news production significantly biased and unbalanced[iii]. Double standards, exaggerations, and fake news characterized these media outlets since the Tigray conflict broke out[iv]. Of all the actors involved, it has been increasingly clear that Abiy’s administration, regardless of its actual role in the Tigray conflict, was the blameworthy instigator without being charged. Similarly, the Eritrean and Amhara regional state forces were also largely condemned. In relative terms, therefore, it could be claimed that the TPLF forces have been received with a measure of nuanced articulation and reporting. Victim and victimizer binary opposition largely clouded the news production, and unfortunately, the latter has been all the actors standing against the TPLF forces.
Western-based academics-turned political intellectuals and activists such as Kjetil Tronvoll and Martin Plaut have been patently biased, to say the least. A review of their recent social media posts, particularly posts from their Twitter accounts since the inception of the Tigray conflict, has been largely characterized by tendencies of activism. Largely tilted towards the views and positions of the TPLF forces, one hardly finds any degree or measure of nuance or detached observation and commentary. This goes against any possible axioms of academic and/or intellectual objectivity. Still, although value-free engagement might be difficult, it is by no means impossible. In other words, a precommitment to justice, equality, freedom, and democracy might be justified on the ground that they constitute the ends of many of our human pursuits. However, there can never be personal facts justifying unwarranted positions, actions, and decisions against what some would consider “others”. Put in yet other words, a symbolic precommitment to justice and democracy can never be taken to account for their one-sided social media activism.
In short, the West has been largely unfair to Ethiopia in many ways and at many levels. The frame of reference here is not the Abiy-led administration, regardless of what it has been doing since assuming power, but Ethiopia in toto. It is a country of one government but with many political parties with many ideologies and programs, interest groups, civil society organizations, many scholars and academics, and more than 110 million Ethiopian citizens. In other words, the decisions, actions, policies, and interventions of many European countries, the USA, the UN, and Western-based media outlets and activists can never be solely (and intelligibly) treated as punishing or rewarding the Abiy-led administration or the Prosperity Party from and/ or in Ethiopia. Measured, therefore, by consequences, it remains as a hard and cold fact that it has been Ethiopia, the country, and society, which has suffered immensely and immeasurably-both from the war and the way the West decided to deal with it.
*Mukerrem Miftah (Ph.D.), Policy Studies, Ethiopian Civil Service University, mukerrem.miftah@ecsu.edu.et,Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect ECS’s editorial stance.
[1] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20201112-egypt-hires-65k-monthly-us-lobbying-firm-after-biden-victory/
[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nine-ethiopian-groups-form-anti-government-alliance-2021-11-05/
[3] https://agoa.info/profiles/ethiopia.html
[4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=shDn6d2BXCQ
[5] https://borkena.com/2021/11/22/no-more-movement-led-demonstration-in-27-cities-in-europe-and-north-america/
[6] https://www.fanabc.com/english/no-more-movement-is-getting-greater-acceptance-all-over-the-world-gcs/
[7] https://waltainfo.com/no-more-campaign-voices-to-unspoken-feeling-of-all-africans-pan-africanist-lawyer/
[8] https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/african-absence-in-un-security-council-great-injustice-erdogan
[9] https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/africa-must-have-due-representation-security-council-ministers-tell-un-debate
[10] https://www.africanews.com/2021/12/14/unhcr-to-hold-session-on-ethiopia-conflict-at-eu-request//
[11] http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/17/un-rights-council-orders-international-probe-of-ethiopia-abuses.
[12] https://newsaf.cgtn.com/news/2021-11-20/Warning-letters-to-BBC-CNN-Reuters-AP-Ethiopian-Media-Authority-15kmVn9Ttwk/index.html
[13] https://borkena.com/2021/12/02/cnn-biased-ethiopia-conflict-reporting-e-screams-for-an-independent-investigation/
